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Do Foreign Mergers & Acquisitions Boost Firm Productivity?
1 Introduction
Over the past decade there has been a surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in
both manufacturing and services. Economists and policy makers tend to assume that foreign-
owned firms have an advantage over domestic firms due to large endowments of intangible
assets which compensate for a lack of local information and experience. There is indeed a
large empirical evidence showing that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic
firms (Doms and Jensen, 1998 for the US; Driffield, 1997; Girma and Go¨rg, 2007; Griffith
and Simpson, 2001; for the UK; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2002, in the case of Belgium;
Pfaffermayer and Bellak, 2002, in the case of Austria; Ruane and Ugur (2004), for Ireland).
More recent studies have shown that a large part of this productivity differential is between
multinational firms and non-multinationals (Griffith, 1999; Oulton, 2000; Temouri, Driffield
and Higon, 2008). Hence, separating the effects of foreign ownership from other firm-specific
factors appears to be difficult. Moreover, most of these studies do not distinguish between
foreign greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions.
Foreign M&A implying a change from domestic to foreign owners provide an appropriate
framework to isolate effects of foreign ownership. However, existing empirical evidence on the
causal link between foreign M&A and firm productivity is inconclusive. To the extent that
foreign investors acquire the best performing firms, the productivity advantage might not be
associated with foreign ownership per se. Harris and Robinson (2003) provide empirical evidence
showing that foreign investors tend to acquire firms with higher productivity in comparison with
other manufacturing firms in the UK. Furthermore, the higher productivity of foreign-owned
multinationals observed at the economy-wide level might simply reflect the fact that they are
concentrated in high productivity sectors (Griffith et al., 2004).
While a number of studies have found positive effects of foreign M&A on firm productivity
(Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987 for the US; Conyon et al, 2002 for the UK; Arnold and Javorcik,
2005, for Indonesia; Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008, in the case of France) other research has found
that acquired firms do not reap any benefit from foreign ownership (Harris and Robinson, 2003,
for the UK), has rejected a causal link (Barba Navaretti et al, 2004) or has found a positive
effect only in the case of US multinationals (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002). Girma and Go¨rg
(2002) examine the effect in two specific industries in the UK. They find that foreign acquisitions
had positive effects on firm productivity in the food sector but negative in electronics.
This paper examines the causal relationship between foreign mergers and acquisitions and
firm productivity in the United Kingdom (UK) in the short and the longer run. Since the
existing empirical evidence is inconclusive, we also address the following additional research
questions to shed more light on the source of the ambiguity in the results: what is the profile
of firms which are acquired by or merged with foreign-owned firms? To what extent do the
effects on firm productivity vary by the country of origin of the acquiring/merging firm? How
do the effects vary at industry level? Do the answers depend on the particular measure of firm
productivity?
We focus on the UK where the number of M&A deals has been especially large. Over
the period 1999-2007 we identify over 10,000 mergers and acquisitions in the UK of which
foreign takeovers account for a quarter of all deals. Griffith et al. (2004) show that foreign
takeovers of non-multinational domestic-owned firms exceed foreign greenfield investments as
the most frequent mode of entry by foreign firms in the UK over the period 1999-2001 in both
manufacturing and services.
The question of whether foreign acquisitions lead to higher productivity is interesting and
relevant for both research and policy. To the extent that foreign investment is perceived as a
source of knowledge spillovers and productivity growth in the host economies, governments in
some countries (including the UK) have designed and implemented policies aiming at attracting
foreign investment. On the other hand, some governments (e.g. in France and Italy) have tended
to discourage foreign take-overs and instead encouraged the emergence of ’national champions’.
Measuring the effect of foreign acquisition on firm productivity raises two major economet-
ric issues. First, foreign investors may acquire better performing firms (selection bias). To
address this selection bias we analyze the causal effect of foreign acquisition on UK firm pro-
ductivity by using propensity score matching following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) combined
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with difference-in-difference estimators (Heckman et al. 1997). Second, the derivation of firm
productivity (total factor productivity) involves several measurement issues. Therefore, we de-
termine total factor productivity (TFP) by means of production function estimations at the
three-digit industry level. We follow the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) which generates
unbiased industry level input elasticities by controlling for the correlation between unobserved
productivity shocks and firm inputs. In addition, we use three alternative firm productivity
measures as a robustness check: and a multilateral TFP index based on Caves et al. (1982),
TFP based on conventional OLS production function estimations, and labor productivity.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, in comparison with existing studies,
we use a richer micro data set which effectively covers all firms in the UK including over 2,000
foreign M&A over the period 1999-2007. Second, we use improved econometric techniques
to account for selection biases and derive several alternative firm productivity measures to
check for the robustness of our main result. Third, we explore the theoretical suggestion of
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) that attributes the heterogenous effects of foreign acquisitions on firm
productivity to industry-specific characteristics of the acquiring firm.
Our results lead us to question the existence of longer-run effects of foreign ownership on
firm TFP in the UK at the aggregate level. However, we do find significant heterogeneity in
the effect of foreign M&A on target firm productivity at the industry level. This heterogeneity
across industries potentially explains the absence of positive TFP effects at the aggregate
level. Moreover, following Nocke and Yeaple (2007) we classify acquiring firms as R&D- and
marketing-intensive. Overall, we uncover a systematic pattern of post-acquisition TFP effects
that is consistent with the most recent theoretical models of firm heterogeneity and cross-border
mergers and acquisitions as mode of foreign entry. Finally, at the aggregate level we find that
foreign acquisitions had positive effects on labor productivity due to capital deepening. This
points to the potentially misleading results from using labor productivity instead of TFP to
measure the causal impact of foreign M&A through technology or organizational spillovers on
target firm performance in the UK.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical
literature. The next section discusses the empirical methodology we use to explore the causal
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relationship between foreign acquisitions and firm productivity. Section 4 specifies the data
and our different approaches to measure firm productivity. Section 5 discusses our empirical
results. Finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The early theoretical literature on foreign direct investment known as the Ownership-Location-
Internalization (OLI) framework (Vernon, 1966; Caves, 1974; Dunning, 1977) has focused on
three characteristics of multinational firms that are likely to explain their better performance
in comparison to domestic-owned firms. These characteristics are: (i) large endowments of
intangible assets that compensate for the lack of local knowledge (of markets, consumer pref-
erences and business practices), hence allowing successful competition with domestic firms; (ii)
location advantages that arise from being located in a foreign country rather than exporting to
it; and (iii) advantages from internalizing technology rather than licensing it to foreign produc-
ers. These elements have been formalized in seminal papers by Markusen (1984, 1995, 2002),
Helpman (1984, 1985), and Markusen and Venables (1997, 1998). More recently, Helpman et
al. (2004) show that in the presence of fixed costs to exporting and to undertaking foreign
direct investment, in equilibrium, heterogeneous firms can be ordered in terms of productivity,
as follows: the least productive exit, the more productive firms serve only the domestic market,
the next more productive serve the domestic market and export, and the most productive firms
serve the domestic market and undertake foreign direct investment. Accordingly, it follows that
in their country of origin multinationals are the most productive firms.
This literature explores the effect of foreign ownership on firm productivity not distinguish-
ing formally whether it refers to greenfield investment or foreign M&A. However, the paper by
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) focuses explicitly on the relationship between cross-border M&A as
a mode of entry into foreign markets and efficiency of firms. The authors show that either the
most or the least productive firms acquire foreign targets. In particular, their model predicts
that foreign acquirers operating in R&D-intensive industries represent the most productive
firms in the corresponding industries in their home country while foreign acquirers operating in
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marketing-intensive industries represent the least productive firms.1 The predictions of Nocke
and Yeaple (2007) contrast with the predictions of the earlier studies which did not distinguish
between foreign M&A and greenfield investment. That is, instead of a linear productivity or-
dering, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) predict that both the most and the least productive firms
will acquire foreign targets. Their finding limits the scope for positive aggregate effects of for-
eign acquisition on firm productivity and instead highlights the importance of industry-specific
effects.
While the heterogenous trade and investment literature suggests that at least some multi-
national firms are more productive than domestic-owned firms, it does not imply that foreign
ownership per se leads to higher productivity. Foreign multinationals may also affect the mar-
ket structure and the degree of competition in the host economy. The industrial organization
(I-O) literature offers further complex insights on the effects of M&A on firm productivity in
the longer-run. On the one hand, incentives to concentrate market power involve a decline in
competition which potentially entails lower long-run productivity growth in that industry. On
the other hand, efficiency gains due to the diffusion of technological or organizational knowl-
edge, economies of scale, or the reduction of managerial slack result in long-run productivity
gains. In the short-run, however, the impact of a take-over on firm productivity is expected to
be negative due to the high short-run costs of reorganization. The latter effect is expected to
be larger after cross-border deals due to higher adaptation costs. Similarly, long-run produc-
tivity effects after foreign M&A are potentially more pronounced due to the larger scope for
knowledge spillovers and adverse competition effects.
3 Empirical strategy
The key empirical objective of this paper is to evaluate the causal effect of foreign acquisition
on firm productivity. The main challenge is that we do not observe the productivity of acquired
firms had they not been acquired. We address this missing data problem by using propensity
1The authors consider R&D and advertising as relatively internationally mobile and immobile factors, re-
spectively.
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score matching (PSM) following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The central idea is to compare
the productivity of foreign-acquired firms with the firm performance of a control group that
includes non-acquired firms with similar observable characteristics. While matching methods
account for the bias due to observable firm characteristics, selection bias might also stem from
time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics. To eliminate this latter bias, we combine the
propensity score matching with the difference-in-difference estimator suggested by Heckman et
al. (1997).
In the first stage, the propensity-score matching estimator summarizes the vector of pre-
treatment characteristics, X, into a single-index variable, the propensity score p(X). The
propensity score measures the conditional probability of a firm to be acquired by a foreign
owner given data on firm characteristics and past firm performance.2
In the second stage, we estimate the average effect of foreign acquisition on target firm
productivity in the post-acquisition period. To do this, we use the productivity of the non-
acquired domestic firms with a similar propensity score to generate counterfactual observations.
To control for the possible bias that is due to selection on unobservables, we compute the
effect using the difference-in-difference matching estimator (Heckman et al, 1997). Hence, we
compare the evolution of productivity of foreign-acquired firms and domestic firms that exhibit
an equivalent ex ante probability of being taken over given firm characteristics, performance
indicators, and time-invariant unobservables. The average effect of acquisition on the acquired
firms for the difference-in-differences matching estimator can be written as
ÂTT =
∑
i∈A
(∆yi −
∑
c∈C
ω(pi, pc)∆yi) (1)
where ∆y is the difference between the average productivity before and after the acquisition,
pi denotes the predicted probability of being acquired for firm i in the group of acquired firms
A, pc the predicted probability of being acquired for firm c in the control group C, and ω(.) is
2It is determined in a probit regression, i.e., the binary dependent variable defines the firm’s acquisition
status in year t. It is equal to 1 in the year of a foreign takeover and 0 if the firm is domestically owned and
has not been acquired during the sample period.
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a function assigning the weights to the counterfactual firms c.3
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
Our analysis is based on firm-level data from the UK over the period from 1999 until 2007.
We employ M&A data from the Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database which has information on
over 2,000 foreign M&A of UK firms between 1999 and 2007. This information is combined
with the data from the Amadeus database which provides detailed balance sheet data for all
UK firms. The combination of both data sets allows us to compare the effects of cross-border
M&A on the performance of acquired firms in different industries and to distinguish short-run
from longer-run effects.
We model the probability (propensity score) of foreign acquisition as a function of the
following firm characteristics observed in the pre-acquisition period: the return on capital (firm
profitability), the ratio of interest expenses to total assets (a proxy of perceived trustworthiness
by financial institutions), a firm’s age, size4, and characteristic variables to capture ownership
and solvency. Two dummy variables capture the ownership status of a firm: state is equal to
1 if its legal form is not private and 0 if it is, while quoted takes the value 1 if a firm is publicly
quoted and 0 if not. The firm’s solvencu status dummy variable exit is equal to 1 if the firm
is insolvent and 0 otherwise. Finally, we account for year fixed effects and for industry-specific
fixed effects, distinguishing sectors by means of three-digit NACE codes in the propensity score
estimation.
The computation of TFP, which is described in the following section, requires information
on output, physical capital, labor, and the corresponding input elasticities. We measure output
as real5 value added. Capital and labor are measured as real fixed tangible assets and the
3We use the propensity score matching procedure as described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
4We employ a firm’s number of employees as a measure of its size.
5Real variables are obtained by using output price deflators at the two-digit industry level and aggregate
input price deflators both stemming from Eurostat.
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number of employees, respectively. We also include gross investment, measured by the change
in the capital stock plus depreciation, which is included as an instrument for the unobservable
technology shock in the estimation procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996).
4.2 Measuring productivity
The difference-in-difference matching estimator provides an appropriate framework to analyze
the causal effect of foreign M&A on UK firm productivity. However, it would produce mislead-
ing results if the underlying productivity measure does not allow for a meaningful cross-firm
comparison. Thus, the quality of the results hinges crucially on the construction of a detailed
and unbiased productivity measure. Therefore, and in contrast to most previous studies, we
use several different productivity measures to check for the robustness of our main results.6
Our main productivity measure is TFP since changes in TFP directly reflect the efficiency
gains following foreign acquisitions due to the diffusion of technological or organizational knowl-
edge and economies of scale. We derive TFP of firm j in sector s at time t as a residual from
a production function in logs:
yjst = θ
k
skjst + θ
l
sljst + ηs + µt + εjst (2)
where yjst denotes a firm’s value added, kjst and ljst the physical capital and labor inputs,
ηs is a vector of industry specific effects, µt a vector of year specific effects, θ = (θ
k, θl) a vector
of average input elasticities, and εjsi an error term.
We estimate (2) to obtain empirical measures of the average input elasticities θks and θ
l
s
from firm level data. We account for heterogenous input elasticities across three-digit (NACE)
industry levels in that we estimate the marginal input effects separately for each of the three-
digit industries.7 The estimation of (2) involves a well-known endogeneity problem, viz, a
firm’s demand for labor is expected to depend on its contemporaneous productivity level which
6We illustrate below that the use of TFP instead of labor productivity is crucial identifying the effect of
foreign acquisitions on subsequent technological capabilities of UK target firms.
7We also employ three-digit output price deflators to deflate the output, capital, and investment series with
industry specific deflators.
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is captured in the error term. Appropriate instruments for labor services that are uncorrelated
with productivity are typically not available. However, Olley and Pakes (1996) develop a
semi-parametric estimator to extract consistent estimates of the input elasticities in production
function estimations. The method supposes that a firm’s investment decision is a function of
its capital stock, age, and its unobserved productivity. Hence, the unobserved productivity
parameter can be modeled as some (inverse) function of investments, capital, and age given the
assumption of a monotonic relationship between investment and productivity. We apply this
methodology to derive consistent estimates of the average input elasticities in our sample. A
detailed description of the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure is given in Appendix A.1.
We derive three additional productivity measures to examine the robustness of our main
results. First, we follow Caves et al. (1982) to develop a relative TFP index using the industry-
level geometric average as a reference point. This methodology employs firm level factor shares,
instead of a production function estimation, to compute the corresponding input elasticities.8
Second, we estimate (2) using a conventional least squares estimator and compute the corre-
sponding TFP levels accordingly. Third, we use labor productivity, which is measured as a ratio
of a firm’s value added to its number of employees, a measure often used in the existing liter-
ature (e.g. Conyon et al, 2002). Note, however, that labor productivity is a broader measure
than TFP since it reflects the joint influence of changes in TFP and the capital-labor ratio, i.e.
in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, we have: ln(Y/L) = ln(TFP ) +αln(K/L).
4.3 Sample properties
Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel. Moreover, we do not observe the amount of value
added and fixed tangible assets for all of the firms.9 This reduces the effective number of foreign
8In particular, the factor shares of labor and intermediate inputs are measured by the mean of firm- and
industry-level (three-digit) factor shares. The factor share of the capital stock is derived by assuming constant
returns to scale. The output and input measures are all computed relative to an industry-level median. Note
that this procedure implicitly assumes perfectly competitive factor markets and constant returns to scale.
9In addition, we restrict the sample to cover non-negative observations for value added, fixed tangible assets,
and number of employees. Note that we do not impose further corrections for outliers among non-target domestic
firms since the matching estimator does not take observations into account which can not be matched properly.
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M&A that can be included in the propensity-score estimation. In the end, we are left with 606
foreign M&A with available data to compute a TFP measure for the UK foreign acquired firms.
The second stage of the difference-in-difference matching estimator, however, requires that a
firm’s TFP measure is available for at least two consecutive years after a foreign takeover which
further reduces the effective number of matched foreign M&A to 392. Finally, since we do not
observe the debt-asset ratio and profitability for all of these firms, the effective number of foreign
M&A in the difference-in-difference estimation is reduced to 318.10 Since the control group of
domestic firms that have not been the target of a (foreign or domestic) takeover numbers over
14,000 firms, it is possible to match target and control firms very closely.11
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the foreign-acquired firms and all other firms
for each of the variables. The average log TFP levels and labor productivity of foreign-acquired
firms are lower than the corresponding productivity indicators of all other firms. Moreover,
foreign-acquired firms have, on average, a higher return to capital, are smaller, younger, more
likely to be quoted or publicly-owned, and less likely to be insolvent. The higher average return
to capital, which measures a firm’s profitability, indicate that foreign acquirers “cherry pick”
on the basis of firm profitability. The propensity score estimations, which are outlined in Ta-
ble 2 below, generally confirm this conjecture. The data also reveal considerable heterogeneity
among foreign-acquired firms, since the standard deviations among these firms generally exceed
the ones among all other firms. Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics for the manufac-
turing and services sectors separately. Accordingly, the TFP measures based on Olley-Pakes
or OLS display higher levels for foreign-acquired firms in the manufacturing sector while all
10Note that we obtain the same qualitative results if we base our effective sample on the 392 foreign M&A by
excluding the debt-asset ratio and our measure of profitability from the propensity score estimation. However,
the balancing tests (see Section 4.5) indicates that both variables improve the test results in some specifications.
11Moreover, 75% of the 318 foreign M&A represent vertical takeovers. We label a takeover “horizontal” if
(a subsidiary of) the acquirer operates in the same industry, defined by four-digit NACE codes, as the target
firm. Otherwise, the M&A is labeled “vertical”. Note that vertical foreign investments are generally considered
to involve a larger scope for spillovers between foreign and domestic firms (e.g. Javorcik, 2004). However,
we do not find significant differences between the effects of vertical and horizontal M&A (see Table A2 in the
Appendix).
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four productivity proxies indicate a lower average level for foreign-acquired firms in the service
industries. In contrast, the returns to capital are higher for foreign-acquired firms in both
sectors.
The reduction in the effective number of foreign M&A in our sample due to the data
requirements of the estimation procedure raises the question of whether the remaining deals
are still representative of the underlying population of more than 2,000 cross-border deals from
1999-2007. Therefore, the last three columns of Table A3 in the Appendix explicitly report the
descriptive statistics for the foreign-acquired firms that can not be accounted for in the second
stage of the difference-in-difference matching estimation. It appears that the TFP levels based
on Olley-Pakes or OLS are very similar among the foreign-acquired firms that are included in the
sample and the ones that have to be excluded. Thus, the main outcome variable in our sample,
TFP based on Olley-Pakes, appears to be representative of the population of foreign-acquired
UK firms. However, labor productivity and TFP based on Caves et al. (1982) are relatively
higher among the latter group while the returns to capital and age are relatively lower.12 Table
A4 in the Appendix lists the total number of deals in the population and our effective sample
across two-digit NACE industries. The fifth and the sixth columns display the shares of the
number of foreign deals in an industry relative to the total number of deals in the two groups,
respectively. The last columns indicate that the distribution of foreign M&A across industries
in the effective sample and in the total population is very similar. There are only some notable
differences in the construction sector as well as two service industries: computer & related
activities and R&D & other business. Therefore, we calculate sample weights for the changes
in TFP in the second stage of the difference-in-difference matching estimator.13 Table A5 in
the Appendix and Table 4 report the results for the weighted and unweighted TFP estimations,
respectively; they reveal that the results in post-acquisition periods are qualitatively the same.
Finally, a Hausman test, which is given in the last column of Table A5 in the Appendix, does
12The level of labor productivity in our effective sample relative to the population seems to be, if anything,
biased downwards. Still, we find a significant increase in labor productivity in post-acquisition periods (see
Section 5) which therefore seems to even understate the effect for the whole population.
13The weights are calculated for each three-digit industry sub-group by dividing the number of foreign M&A
in the population by the number of foreign M&A in the sample.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Target firms All other firms
firms mean sd firms mean sd
lntfp-op 318 0.70 0.52 14330 0.71 0.60
Y/L 400 256.81 931.71 12884 552.88 2375.10
lntfp-ols 318 0.76 0.53 14330 0.80 0.60
lntfp-Caves 316 -1.12 2.54 14330 -0.19 31.01
return-cap 318 31.40 93.33 14330 28.69 70.89
debt-asset 318 0.02 0.02 14330 0.02 0.02
size 318 1.22 5.66 14330 5.79 4.86
age 318 27.68 24.72 14330 28.74 21.78
state 318 0.14 0.35 14330 0.09 0.29
quoted 318 0.06 0.24 14330 0.03 0.17
exit 318 0.02 0.14 14330 0.03 0.17
Manufacturing (NACE 15-37):
lntfp-op 127 0.55 0.36 51382 0.51 0.43
Y/L 161 129.81 378.26 45523 346.69 979.32
lntfp-ols 127 0.58 0.32 51382 0.56 0.40
lntfp-Caves 126 -1.04 2.06 51382 -0.09 3.45
return-cap 127 26.55 90.05 51382 20.52 51.73
debt-asset 127 0.02 0.02 51382 0.02 0.02
size 127 0.95 4.01 51382 0.65 4.92
age 127 31.50 29.48 51382 34.61 25.19
state 127 0.08 0.27 51382 0.08 0.27
quoted 127 0.02 0.12 51382 0.04 0.19
exit 127 0.02 0.12 51382 0.03 0.17
Services (NACE 50-74):
lntfp-op 166 0.79 0.61 100600 0.83 0.64
Y/L 215 351.47 1194.75 92858 668.94 2779.61
lntfp-ols 166 0.86 0.62 100600 0.89 0.66
lntfp-Caves 165 -1.11 2.95 100600 -0.25 40.46
return-cap 166 33.45 101.71 100600 31.78 78.47
debt-asset 166 0.01 0.02 100600 0.02 0.02
size 166 1.34 6.64 100600 0.55 4.84
age 166 24.33 20.45 100600 25.94 19.90
state 166 0.18 0.39 100600 0.10 0.30
quoted 166 0.09 0.29 100600 0.03 0.16
exit 166 0.02 0.15 100600 0.03 0.18
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not reject the exogeneity of our sampling procedure.
4.4 Propensity score estimation
The first stage of the estimation strategy involves the estimation of the propensity scores. Ta-
ble 2 reports the results of the corresponding probit estimation. Note that all explanatory
variables are lagged by one year since we aim to account for pre-takeover firm characteristics.14
The first column shows that there is a positive concave relationship between the size of a firm
and the probability of a foreign takeover. Moreover, the probability of a foreign takeover is
declining in the age of a firm and significantly influenced by industry- and year fixed effects.
The coefficients of TFP and profitability are negative and positive, respectively, but not sig-
nificant at conventional levels. The next columns provide the results of the probit estimations
that correspond to our alternative estimation specifications. They reveal the determinants of
domestic M&A, foreign takeovers by US and EU+ firms15, and M&A in the manufacturing and
service sector, respectively. The last two columns display the findings for TFP based on Caves
et al. (1982) and labor productivity. Most importantly, our evidence suggests that domestic
takeovers tend to favor less productive firms. In addition, the results show that foreign firms
from other EU+ countries acquire, on average, more profitable UK firms. This suggests that
“cherry-picking” for this type of M&A is based on profitability instead of productivity which
is harder to observe.16
14The Zephyr database provides two different calendar dates for each takeover: the day when the deal has
been announced and the date when it has been completed. In the following, we use the date of completion to
identify the year of a takeover. We obtain, however, the same qualitative results if we alternatively use the year
of announcement. The corresponding results are available from the authors upon request.
15EU+ represents the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
16We do find cherry picking based on TFP in the manufacturing sector if we exclude the profitability measure
and include the ratio of R&D over assets as an additional determinant for foreign M&A. However, we only
observe R&D for 270 of the 318 deals in the effective sample. Therefore, we do not include this variable in the
propensity score estimation. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Propensity score estimation
for M&A dom M&A US M&A EU+ M&A man M&A ser M&A for M&A for M&A
lntfp-op -.0424 -.0624∗∗∗ -.0359 -.0734∗ -.0464 -.0688∗
(-1.39) (-2.69) (-.74) (-1.71) (-.78) (-1.73)
lntfp-Caves -.0001∗∗
(-2.05)
Y/L -.0005
(-1.24)
return-cap .0003 .0001 .0003 .0005∗∗ .0006 .0002 .0002 -.0002
(1.41) (.43) (.99) (2.04) (1.14) (.87) (1.01) (-.92)
debt-asset .1569 -.2031 -1.24 .3038 2.50∗∗∗ -2.50∗ .1573 .5059∗∗∗
(.28) (-.35) (-.89) (.48) (3.59) (-1.86) (.28) (2.60)
size .0330∗∗∗ .0291∗∗∗ .0208∗∗ .0512∗∗∗ .0575∗∗∗ .0287∗∗∗ .0330∗∗∗ .0230∗∗∗
(3.55) (3.27) (2.18) (3.49) (2.76) (2.97) (3.55) (2.88)
size2 -.0004∗ -.0005∗∗ -.0002∗ -.0012∗∗ -.0011∗∗ -.0003∗ -.0004∗ -.0003∗
(-1.88) (-2.20) (-1.61) (-2.40) (-2.11) (-1.63) (-1.88) (1.87)
age -.0018∗∗ -.0021∗∗∗ -.0020 -.0019∗ -.0020∗ -.0012 -.0017∗ -.0019∗∗
(-1.96) (-2.79) (-1.39) (-1.65) (-1.62) (-.88) (-1.93) (-2.28)
state .0513 -.0944∗ -.1002 .2026∗∗∗ .0624 .0302 .0524 .0117
(.87) (-1.76) (-.95) (3.03) (.59) (.40) (.89) (.21)
quoted -.0329 -.1729∗ .3500∗∗ .0137 -.4844∗∗ .1252 -.0316 .0646
(-.32) (-1.61) (2.39) (.11) (-2.17) (.98) (-.30) (.73)
exit -.0106 .1907∗∗∗ .0216 -.0242 .3472 -.1523 -.0089 .0389
(-.12) (3.00) (.15) (-.19) (1.59) (-1.06) (-.10) (.47)
year-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-values of joint test:
year-FE = 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
industry-FE = 0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Observation. 152608 161216 126912 128729 42678 92682 152608 138839
pseudo R2 .042 .044 .060 .051 .042 .045 .042 .045
ps-likelihood -3080 -4845 -1204 -1665 -1146 -1662 -3081 -3263
Sample covers all U.K. firms with information on value added, employment, and investments between
1999-2007. M&A is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in the year of a (foreign) takeover and 0 if
the firm is domestic and has not been the target of a (domestic or foreign) takeover between 1999-2007.
Explanatory variables lagged by one year. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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4.5 Balancing test
The difference-in-difference matching method provides a robust method for estimating the for-
eign acquisition effect on firm productivity if, conditional on the propensity score, the potential
outcomes before and after acquisition are independent of the acquisition. Under the assumption
of independence conditional on observables, the pre-acquisition variables should be balanced be-
tween the acquired and matched groups. Lack of balance points to a possible mis-specification
of the propensity score estimation. We handle the balancing hypothesis in two ways: (i) we test
the significance of differences between acquired and matched firms for each variable entering
the propensity score estimation; (ii) we test whether those differences can be taken as jointly
insignificant using a likelihood ratio test.
Table 3 summarizes the results for the balancing tests based on the different matching
estimates.17 The standardized differences between the acquired and matched control firms are
smaller than 15% for foreign and domestic M&A.18 Moreover, the formal paired t-test between
acquired and matched control firms indicates that the balancing hypothesis can not be rejected
at conventional levels for most of the individual series. The balancing hypothesis is rejected
at the 5% for the age of a firm in the case of domestic M&A and for the debt-to-asset ratio
in the manufacturing sector, respectively. In addition, it is rejected for the dummy variables
“quoted” and “state” at the 5% level for US and EU+ M&A and in the service sector.
In addition to the t-test for the individual series, we use a likelihood-ratio test which tests
for the joint insignificance of the standardized differences between the acquired and the matched
control firms. The corresponding p-values of the likelihood ratio test are presented in the fifth
and ninth column in each of the corresponding tables that report the results of the difference-
in-difference matching estimator (Tables 4-8). Accordingly, the test results show that the
balancing conditions are satisfied for each difference-in-difference matching estimation in each
17Table 3 outlines the test results based on the matching estimator for year 0. The test results for all other
years can also not be rejected but are not reported here. The corresponding summaries are available from
authors upon request.
18Even though there is no formal criterion as to how large a standardized bias should be at most, we follow
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in assuming that a value of 20% is large.
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year.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Aggregate TFP effects
Table 4 reports the results of the difference-in-difference matching estimator. The first column
shows the (cumulative) effect of foreign acquisition on firm productivity in the year of comple-
tion of a takeover (0) up to 5 years thereafter. We find that foreign-acquired firms have, on
average, 5.1% lower TFP-growth in the takeover year than domestic firms that had a compara-
ble pre-takeover probability of becoming a foreign M&A target.19 The coefficient is statistically
significant at a 5% level. The estimation is based on 318 foreign takeovers between 1999 and
2007. The cumulative growth difference is close to zero in the first year, increases to 4% two
years afterwards, and levels off at about 2-3% in the third and fourth year after the takeover.20
However, the positive cumulative growth differences in the first four years after the M&A are
not statistically significant at conventional levels.21
The negative initial impact of M&A suggests the presence of restructuring costs that reduce
the TFP-level in the year of completion of the M&A. In contrast, we do not find evidence for
positive longer-run effects of foreign M&A on the productivity of acquired firms.
The limited evidence for positive productivity effects of foreign M&A in the first five years
after the takeover might be explained by heterogenous TFP performances among foreign ac-
quired firms. In particular, the existence or magnitude of productivity spillovers might depend
19We employ the Epanechikov kernel matching estimator. The results are, however, qualitatively equivalent
if we use a Gaussian kernel estimator or the nearest neighborhood matching estimator. The results of the
alternative estimations are available from the authors upon request.
20We use the n+ 1’s difference in log TFP-levels to compute the growth rate n years after the takeover. For
example, if a foreign M&A takes place in t TFP-growth in the fourth year after the takeover is compute as
lnTFPt+4 − lnTFPt−1.
21Table A1 in the Appendix reports the effects of domestic M&A on target firm TFP as a consistency check.
Accordingly, the TFP effects of domestic M&A follow a different pattern over time than those for foreign M&A.
Still, the corresponding coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Table 3: Balancing test from kernel estimation
Mean % bias t-test Mean % bias t-test
target control target control
foreign M&A: domestic M&A:
lntfp-op .6970 .7088 -2.2 -0.28 .6802 .7090 -5.5 -0.84
return-cap 31.40 29.47 2.4 0.30 31.87 29.33 3.6 0.56
debt-asset .0179 .0168 5.4 0.68 .0163 .0169 -3.1 -0.47
size 1.22 .5500 13.0 1.65 .6700 .5800 2.4 0.37
size2 34.00 21.00 2.0 0.25 10.00 12.00 -2.1 -0.32
age 27.68 29.18 -6.5 -0.82 26.27 29.09 -12.8 -1.97
state .1447 .0971 14.6 1.84 .0764 .0970 -7.3 -1.12
quoted .0629 .0323 14.4 1.82 .0191 .0312 -7.7 -1.19
exit .0189 .0270 -5.4 -0.68 .0297 .0277 1.2 0.19
US M&A: EU M&A:
lntfp-op .7376 .7286 1.5 0.11 .6746 .7233 -8.9 -0.80
return-cap 29.05 30.17 -1.7 -0.12 36.81 30.15 7.7 0.69
debt-asset .0161 .0169 -3.9 -0.29 .0186 .0165 10.4 0.93
size 1.37 .4735 14.8 1.10 1.19 .5590 14.7 1.32
size2 62.13 13.44 8.9 0.66 18.78 19.97 .2 0.02
age 24.21 28.50 -20.2 -1.50 28.76 28.81 -0.2 -0.02
state .1607 .0964 19.3 1.44 .2112 .1024 30.2 2.71
quoted .1161 .0302 33.3 2.49 .0932 .0338 24.5 2.19
exit .0179 .0265 -5.9 -0.44 .0186 .0261 -5.1 -0.45
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Table 3 continued
Mean % bias t-test Mean % bias t-test
target control target control
manufacturing M&A: services M&A:
lntfp-op .5454 .5331 3.2 0.26 .7927 .8056 -2.1 -0.19
return-cap 26.55 21.54 6.9 0.55 33.45 32.43 1.1 0.10
debt-asset .0236 .0166 33.6 2.69 .0145 .0175 -16.4 -1.49
size .9500 .7100 5.0 0.39 1.34 .4856 15.6 1.43
size2 17.00 31.00 -1.9 -0.15 45.58 15.49 5.6 0.51
age 31.50 35.10 -13.1 -1.04 24.33 26.49 -10.8 -0.98
state .0787 .0885 -3.5 -0.28 .1807 .1042 22.0 2.00
quoted .0158 .0421 -15.8 -1.25 .0904 .0291 26.0 2.37
exit .0158 .0248 -6.4 -0.51 0.0241 .0272 -1.9 -0.18
foreign M&A: foreign M&A:
Y/L 17.32 71.47 -12.0 -1.50
lntfp-Ca -1.12 -.1382 -6.3 -0.79
return-cap 13.39 25.74 -12.0 -1.70 31.30 29.43 2.3 0.29
debt-asset .0194 .0176 7.5 1.06 .0179 .0168 5.7 0.72
size 1.10 .6852 7.7 1.10 1.23 .5524 13.1 1.65
size2 27.68 31.32 -.5 -0.07 33.67 21.23 2.0 0.25
age 27.72 28.85 -4.8 -0.68 27.64 29.19 -6.7 -0.84
state .15 .1195 8.9 1.26 .1456 .0972 14.8 1.86
quoted .07 .0410 12.7 1.79 .0633 .0323 14.5 1.82
exit .0325 .0296 1.7 0.24 .0190 .0270 -5.3 -0.67
Balancing tests based on propensity score matching for year 0.
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Table 4: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on TFP
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0511∗∗ (-2.00) 318/124688 .219
1 .0130 (0.49) 239/102582 .198
2 .0402 (1.03) 176/84647 .178
3 .0315 (0.84) 133/68581 .160
4 .0203 (0.49) 92/54050 .186
5 -.0566 (-1.03) 72/40034 .103
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
LR-test of joint insignificance of all regressors after matching.
Table 5: The cumulative effect of US versus EU M&A on TFP
US M&A EU M&A
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0234 (-0.42) 112/103431 .373 -.0207 (-0.68) 161/104684 .123
1 .0558 (1.16) 83/84873 .237 -.0083 (-0.21) 126/85758 .240
2 .1478∗ (1.66) 56/69859 .378 .0159 (0.39) 96/70524 .215
3 .0212 (0.35) 45/56464 .808 .0551 (0.92) 67/56993 .126
4 .0360 (0.42) 31/44373 .612 -.0187 (-0.35) 45/44789 .373
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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on the home country of the foreign acquirer. For example, Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002)
uncover positive M&A effects only in the case of US multinationals. In Table 5, we distinguish
between two different regions of origin of the foreign acquirer: the US and the EU+. The
evolution of the TFP performance of target firms of US multinationals is comparable to the
overall effect of foreign takeovers in the first four post M&A periods: the coefficient is negative
in the year of completion, positive thereafter, peaks in the second year after the M&A, and
levels off afterwards.22 However, the positive growth difference in the second year after the
M&A is 3.5 times higher (it amounts to 14.8%) and statistically significant at the 10% level for
US takeovers. Thus, we find some evidence in favor of positive TFP effects from foreign M&A
if the acquiring firm is based in the US. In contrast, we do not observe significant impacts of
M&A from EU+ countries.
Table 6 distinguishes between the effects from foreign takeovers in manufacturing and ser-
vice industries. The evolution of TFP for target firms in the manufacturing sector is again
comparable to the overall effect of foreign takeovers in the first four post M&A periods: the
coefficient, which amounts to 7.8%, is negative and significant at a 5% level in the year of the
takeover and positive but not significant at conventional levels thereafter. In contrast, we are
not able to detect a similar pattern in the service sector. The corresponding coefficients are
very small and not significant.
Finally, Table 7 outlines the results for two alternative TFP measures which are based
on an OLS production function estimation and the multilateral TFP index (lntfp − Caves)
developed by Caves et al. (1982), respectively. The latter TFP indicator has been used in
the literature, e.g., by Bertrand and Zitouna (2008).23 Table 7 shows that we do not find a
significant aggregate impact of foreign takeovers on target firm productivity in post-acquisition
periods based on these two alternative TFP measures. This is consistent with the results based
on Olley-Pakes TFP levels.24
22The pattern of TFP effects due to US (or foreign) takeovers can be described by an ’S-curve’.
23Note that, in contrast to our preferred TFP measure based on Olley and Pakes (1998), it implicitly assumes
perfect competition in factor markets and constant returns to scale in order to compute input elasticities.
24We also convert the logged TFP levels based on Olley-Pakes into a TFP index relative to industry averages.
The results, which are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix, do not differ qualitatively from the findings in
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Table 6: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on TFP in manufacturing versus services
M&A in manufacturing M&A in services
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0779∗∗ (-2.39) 127/35677 .164 -.0374 (-0.90) 166/74656 .173
1 .0159 (0.41) 95/29894 .744 .0270 (0.68) 126/60775 .191
2 .0283 (0.53) 71/25127 .506 .0702 (1.19) 95/49622 .286
3 .0899 (1.32) 57/20691 .492 -.0096 (-.21) 67/39804 .321
4 .0602 (.99) 40/16589 .544 -.0002 (-0.00) 46/31071 .256
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 7: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on alternative TFP measures
Caves et al. OLS
year TFP-Ca-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-OLS-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.1782 (-1.13) 316/124251 .001 -.0523∗∗ (-2.07) 318/124688 .164
1 -.1302 (-0.87) 239/102188 .004 .0122 (.47) 239/102582 .145
2 -.1558 (-1.08) 176/84320 .010 .0408 (1.08) 176/84471 .165
3 -.1071 (-0.61) 133/68319 .022 .0283 (.78) 133/68581 .176
4 -.1062 (-0.49) 91/53832 .066 .0141 (.34) 92/54050 .214
5 -.4134 (-1.18) 72/40873 .074 -.0614 (-1.07) 72/41034 .101
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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In sum, we do not find solid evidence in favor of a longer-run TFP gain in the post-acquisition
period caused by foreign acquisition at the aggregate level.
5.2 Industry specific effects
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) highlight the importance of industry specific effects of the relationship
between firm productivity and cross-border M&A. To explore this, we analyze the impact of
foreign M&A separately for 34 different two-digit industries. Table 8 shows the results for the
six industries where we identify a positive causal impact of foreign M&A on UK target firm TFP
levels in post-acquisition periods. First, we detect a negative significant initial drop in TFP that
is followed by insignificant effects thereafter relative to domestic firms in the food, beverages
& tobacco industries. Second, we find pronounced positive TFP effects due to foreign M&A in
three manufacturing industries: manufacture of electrical equipment & machinery, manufacture
of communication equipment & apparatus, and printing & publishing. Foreign-acquired firms
outperform their domestic counterparts by 20-100% in the second to the fourth year after the
takeover in the first two manufacturing industries and two years after the M&A in printing and
publishing. Third, we observe the opposite impacts in two different service industries. On the
one hand, foreign-acquired firms experience lower TFP-growth than domestic counterparts in all
post M&A periods in renting of machinery & equipment. On the other hand, they have higher
TFP-growth until the second post-takeover year in computer and related activities. Thus, we
find positive evidence in favor of technological or organizational spillovers from foreign acquirers
to domestic target firms in the electronic manufacturing and service industries. In other words,
the potential for positive productivity effects appears to be largest in UK electronic industries.25
Overall, the industry level results highlight a significant heterogeneity in the effect of foreign
acquisitions on target firm productivity across industries which is consistent with the Nocke and
Yeaple (2007) theoretical predictions. This heterogeneity across industries potentially explains
our baseline specification.
25This finding differs from Girma and Go¨rg (2002) who use, however, a different data set, methodology, and
a different measure of TFP.
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the absence of positive longer-run TFP effects at the aggregate level.26
Moreover, the theoretical model of Nocke and Yeaple (2007) implies that the scope for pro-
ductivity spillovers from the acquiring to the target firm is most pronounced if the acquirer
operates in an R&D-intensive industry while productivity spillovers might even be negative if
it operates in a marketing-intensive industry. A direct test of this hypothesis requires, however,
information on the R&D and marketing expenses of the acquiring firms, respectively. This
information is not available in the Amadeus data set. However, we can draw on the work
of Peneder (2002) who uses cluster analysis to classify US manufacturing industries as R&D
and marketing-intensive at the four-digit level.27 We follow his classification to test for pos-
itive or negative productivity effects in the two different sub-groups, respectively.28 Table 9
reveals positive TFP coefficients in all post-acquisition periods if the acquirer operates in an
R&D-intensive industry indicating that foreign ownership enhances the TFP levels of foreign-
acquired firms in these industries.29 The effect is, however, only significant on a 10% level
in the fourth year after the acquisition. In contrast, we find negative TFP coefficients in all
26Moreover, (horizontal) foreign M&A may lead to a concentration in market power involving a decline in
competition which potentially entails lower long-run productivity growth in that industry. This effect would
counteract the positive productivity effects and might hence also explain the absence of positive longer-run TFP
effects at the aggregate level.
27Peneder (2002) classifies the following manufacturing industries as R&D-intensive: pesticides and other
agro-chemical products, pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, botanical, and other chemical products, office
machinery and computers, electricity distribution and control apparatus, electronic components, television and
radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony, television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or
reproducing apparatus, medical, precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles, aircraft and spacecraft. Fur-
thermore, he classifies the following as marketing-intensive: food products, beverages and tobacco, leather and
leather products, publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media, soap and detergents, cleaning and
polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations, tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufac-
ture of central heating radiators and boilers, cutlery, tools and general hardware, watches and clocks, musical
instruments, sports goods, games and toys, miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.
28We assume that R&D and marketing intensities are comparable across countries at the industry level.
29We also classify target firms in high or low technology industries, respectively, following the OECD classifi-
cations (see for example OECD, 2007, p. 220-221). However, we do not find significant effects of foreign M&A
in these particular sub-groups. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 8: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on TFP by two-digit NACE codes
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
Food, beverages & tobacco: Publishing & printing:
0 -.1695∗∗ (-2.13) 16/4197 .734 .1153 (1.17) 10/3937 .613
1 -.0704 (-0.82) 11/3558 .888 .0141 (0.22) 8/3294 .504
2 -.0473 (-0.36) 10/3006 .770 .2988∗ (1.84) 6/2762 .650
3 -.0783 (-0.77) 8/2491 .781 .3201 (0.66) 3/2251 .608
4 -.1042 (-0.60) 5/2012 .817 .2503 (1.23) 2/1798 .726
Manuf. of office & electrical mach.: Manuf. of communication equ.:
0 -.0818 (0.96) 9/2501 .377 -.3213∗ (-1.65) 3/766 .688
1 .1979∗∗∗ (3.27) 5/2081 .813 .1494 (0.26) 3/635 .785
2 .1431∗∗ (2.08) 5/1754 .811 1.03∗∗∗ (2.97) 3/523 .491
3 .1818∗∗∗ (2.77) 3/1447 .643 1.45∗∗∗ (2.93) 3/434 .501
4 .2795∗∗∗ (3.95) 3/1160 .657
Renting of mach. & equ.: Computer services & related act.:
0 -.2324∗ (-1.92) 4/1177 .826 -.0323 (-0.50) 22/3880 .921
1 -.1640∗∗ (-2.08) 3/974 .688 -.1236 (-1.03) 13/3088 .674
2 -.1616∗∗ (2.38) 3/807 .678 .1990∗∗∗ (2.55) 7/2485 .905
3 -.0775∗∗∗ (-4.47) 3/650 .706 -.0341 (-0.31) 5/1972 .957
4 -.0711∗∗∗ (-2.82) 2/512 .705 .1177 (1.31) 3/1505 .437
The industry codes are NACE15-16, NACE22, NACE30-31, NACE32,
NACE71, NACE72, NACE72, respectively.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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post-acquisition periods if the acquirer operates in a marketing-intensive industry indicating
that foreign ownership leads to a decline in the TFP levels of foreign-acquired firms in these
industries. Again, the effect is only significant at a 10% level in the second year after a foreign
takeover. In sum, a classification of acquiring firms as R&D and marketing-intensive results in
a systematic pattern of post-acquisition TFP effects that is consistent with the specific TFP
ranking of acquiring firms in Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
5.3 Labor productivity
The findings in Section 5.1 call into question the evidence of longer-run TFP effects of foreign
ownership on foreign-acquired firms in the UK at the aggregate level and highlight instead a
substantial heterogeneity in the effects across industries. These findings are consistent with
Harris and Robinson (2003) who do not find aggregate TFP effects due to foreign M&A in
the UK. However, they conflict with the findings of Conyon et al. (2002) who detect that US
subsidiaries in the UK outperform domestic firms in terms of labor productivity. Therefore,
we address the following question: does the impact of foreign M&A depend on the measure of
firm productivity?
Table 10 reports the results for the difference-in-difference matching estimator for the ef-
fects of foreign acquisition on firm labor productivity. Indeed, we find that the use of labor
productivity as a performance measure results in significant productivity increases due to for-
eign takeovers in all of the first five post-acquisition periods.30 This is consistent with the labor
productivity based findings of Conyon et al. (2002). The last four columns of Table 10 repeat
the aggregate TFP results form Table 4 to contrast the difference between the two productivity
measures. Moreover, Table 11 distinguishes between labor productivity effects in the manufac-
turing and service sector and reveals that the increase in labor productivity is predominantly
30Note that the likelihood ratio test rejects the balancing conditions in the second and third year after the
takeover. Thus, the matching procedure does not allow for a meaningful comparison between foreign-acquired
firms and the counterfactual of domestic firms for these periods. However, Table 11 shows that the increase
in labor productivity is mainly due to an increase in the manufacturing sector and the balancing condition is
satisfied in this sector in all post-acquisition periods.
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Table 9: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on TFP if acquirer R&D or marketing-intensive
Acquirer R&D-intensive Acquirer marketing-intensive
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0726 (-1.03) 29/19172 .759 -.1193∗∗ (-2.19) 13/7893 .444
1 .0525 (0.63) 20/15704 .686 -.1456 (-1.59) 8/6406 .785
2 .0217 (0.18) 16/12873 .695 -.2222∗ (-1.79) 7/5172 .820
3 .2407 (1.34) 14/10306 .638 -.1373 (-1.03) 6/4027 .849
4 .1684∗ (1.66) 11/7834 .843 -.2253 (-1.19) 4/2974 .839
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 10: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on labor productivity versus TFP
labor productivity TFP
year Y/L-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0192 (-0.83) 400/118675 .047 -.0511∗∗ (-2.00) 318/124688 .219
1 .1064∗∗∗ (3.97) 319/98379 .245 .0130 (0.49) 239/102582 .198
2 .0700∗∗ (2.01) 247/81177 .021 .0402 (1.03) 176/84647 .178
3 .1115∗∗∗ (2.88) 189/65710 .002 .0315 (0.84) 133/68581 .160
4 .1446∗∗∗ (2.70) 146/51648 .094 .0203 (0.49) 92/54050 .186
5 .2242∗∗∗ (3.55) 105/38860 .149 -.0566 (-1.03) 72/40034 .103
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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driven by manufacturing industries. It follows that foreign-acquired firms outperform matched
domestic firms in the manufacturing sector in terms of labor productivity but not TFP in
post-acquisition periods.31
Against this background, it is important to recall the difference between the two measures.
TFP reflects target firm efficiency gains due to the diffusion of technological or organizational
knowledge and economies of scale. Therefore, it is a precise empirical counterpart to the theo-
retical literature on multinational firms which exactly emphasizes these transmission channels.
Labor productivity, in contrast, is a broader measure that captures these TFP effects as well
as changes in the target firm’s capital-labor ratio. For example, one can derive the following
log-linear relationship between labor productivity, TFP and the capital-labor ratio in the case
of a Cobb-Douglas production function: ln(Y/L) = ln(TFP ) + αln(K/L). Hence, we support
that the increase in labor productivity due to foreign ownership stems from an increase in the
capital-labor ratio, i.e., capital deepening, instead of technological or organizational knowledge
diffusion. Table 12 confirms this conjecture, revealing that foreign M&A leads to capital deep-
ening in UK target manufacturing firms in post-acquisition periods. The order of magnitude
of the increases in the capital-labor ratios is in line with the increases in labor productivity.
Thus, foreign firms substantially restructure acquired firms in the UK reducing the number of
employees relative to capital stocks.32 This finding reconciles the difference between the results
based on TFP and labor productivity.
It follows that the use of labor productivity instead of TFP to measure the impact of
foreign acquisition on improvements in technological or organizational knowledge in the UK
acquired firms is misleading. Instead, the increase in foreign acquired firm’s labor productivity
in post-acquisition periods is caused by capital deepening and not the theoretically suggested
TFP effects. This confirms that TFP is the more appropriate measure to identify the causal
impact of foreign acquisitions on firm performance as described in the theoretical literature on
31Table A1 in the Appendix reports the effects of domestic M&A on labor productivity. It does not indicate
any positive effect of domestic M&A on labor productivity in post-acquisition periods, in contrast to the effects
of foreign M&A.
32In fact, we find that the number of employees in foreign-acquired firms declines significantly in the manu-
facturing sector in post-acquisition periods. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 11: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on labor productivity in manufacturing vs
services
manufacturing services
year Y/L-diff deals/obs LR-test Y/L-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0558∗ (-1.84) 161/33852 .040 .0025 (.07) 215/72423 .043
1 .1125∗∗∗ (3.03) 126/28684 .231 .1050∗∗∗ (2.60) 174/59364 .233
2 .1308∗∗∗ (2.86) 103/24144 .456 .0001 (0.00) 131/48457 .112
3 .0974∗∗ (2.56) 83/19927 .443 .0672 (0.99) 95/38779 .042
4 .1074∗∗∗ (2.05) 64/15946 .642 .1121 (1.23) 76/30136 .216
5 .2323∗∗ (2.55) 45/12224 .684 .1490∗ (1.68) 55/22393 .485
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table 12: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on capital-labor ratio in manufacturing vs
services
manufacturing services
year K/L-diff deals/obs LR-test K/L-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0001 (-.00) 160/34518 .000 .0204 (.39) 207/73316 .018
1 .1289∗∗∗ (2.83) 126/29492 .057 .0018 (.02) 171/60829 .093
2 .2000∗∗∗ (3.43) 104/25076 .219 -.0443 (-.41) 130/50193 .125
3 .1580∗∗ (2.11) 84/20878 .237 -.0853 (-.79) 94/40550 .044
4 .1517 (1.59) 64/16896 .573 -.1428 (-.87) 75/31714 .159
5 .0534 (.43) 44/13059 .639 -.2674∗ (-1.68) 55/23776 .448
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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multinational firms.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the causal relationship between foreign acquisitions and target firm pro-
ductivity using a rich micro data set from the UK over the period 1999-2007. We use propensity
score matching combined with a difference-in-difference estimator which allows us to distinguish
between causality and correlation effects of foreign ownership.
Our results call into question the existence of longer-run effects of foreign ownership on
TFP at the aggregate level. A supplementary analysis which distinguishes between different
countries of origin of foreign acquirers does not challenge this main conclusion.
However, we find that the effects of foreign acquisitions vary across industries. It appears
that foreign ownership led to higher productivity in ICT manufacturing industries but not
in ICT service industries. These industry level results highlight a significant heterogeneity
in the effect of foreign M&A on target firm productivity across industries which is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007). This heterogeneity across indus-
tries potentially explains the absence of positive longer-run TFP effects at the aggregate level.
Moreover, when we follow the theoretical suggestions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007) by classifying
acquiring firms as R&D and marketing-intensive, we broadly reveal a systematic pattern of
post-acquisition TFP effects that is consistent with their theoretical predictions which generate
a specific TFP ranking of acquiring firms.
Finally, we find positive aggregate effects on labor productivity but not TFP in the man-
ufacturing sector, i.e., foreign M&A leads to capital deepening but not improvements in tech-
nological or organizational knowledge in the longer-run. Hence, the use of labor productivity
instead of TFP generates misleading results with respect to the causal impact of foreign M&A
on target firm performance in the UK as described in the theoretical literature on multinational
firms.
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A Appendix
A.1 Estimation of production functions under simultaneity
Using equation (2) we decompose the error term εjt into two elements, i.e., εjt = ωjt + jt,
where ωjt is the productivity shock and jt is the true error term. Further, ajt measures a the
age of a firm. Hence, we can write
Yjt = α0 + α
kkjt + α
lljt + ωjt + jt (3)
The simultaneity problem arises if ωjt is correlated with at least one of the regressors. In
such a case, estimates θˆk and θˆl would be biased. In the recent literature on the estimation
of production functions, one generally assumes that the demand for labor is the only input
which is potentially correlated with ωjt as capital stocks are assumed to be predetermined. As
a remedy, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a two-stage procedure for a consistent estimation of
(3) in which they advocate the use of a firm’s log investment ijt to identify the productivity
shock. In doing so, they define the investment function ι such that ijt = ιt(ωjt, kjt, ajt). If
investments are monotonically increasing in the technology shock for a given value of capital
and age, this allows them to express the unobservable technology variable as a function of
contemporaneous investments, capital, and age. Hence, they define the inverse investment
function by mt so that ωjt = mt(ijt, kjt). Thus, one can rewrite (3) as
Yjt = α0 + α
kkjt + α
lljt +mt(ijt, kjt) + jt. (4)
Further, we define
φt(ijt, kjt) := α0 + α
kkjt +mt(ijt, kjt)
and approximate this term by a third order polynomial series in k and i.33 Consequently, we
33In particular, we define
φt(i, k, a) = θ0 +
3∑
p=1
(θipi
p + θkpk
p + θikp (ik)
p).
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can write
Yjt = α
lljt + φt(ijt, kjt) + jt (5)
Since we control for contemporaneous movements in productivity by the inverse investment
function, OLS estimation of (5) yields consistent estimates of αl.
The second stage is necessary to identify αk. Therefore, we assume that productivity follows
a first order Markov chain, i.e, ωjt = E(ωjt|ωjt−1) + ξjt, where ξjt denotes the innovation in the
productivity and is assumed to be uncorrelated with capital in period t. Defining vt as output
net of the contributions of labor and substituting ht−1(i
j
t−1, k
j
t−1) into a function
g(φjt−1 − αkkjt−1),
we can write34
vjt = α0 + α
kkjt + g(·) + ξjt + jt (6)
Note that we restrict capital and lagged capital to have the same coefficient. Consequently,
as the coefficient enters the regression equation twice we estimate it efficiently and consistently
by applying to (6) a non-linear least squares procedure.
A.2 Additional robustness checks
Table A1 reports the effects of domestic M&A on target firm TFP and labor productivity.
Accordingly, the TFP effects of domestic M&A follow a different pattern over time than those
for the foreign M&A. However, they are not statistically significant at conventional levels (apart
from a positive TFP effect in the fifth year after a domestic takeover which is significant at
the 10 % level). Moreover, we do not detect a positive effect of domestic M&A on labor
productivity in post-acquisition periods (apart from the third year after a domestic takeover
which is significant at the 10 % level). Hence, in contrast to foreign M&A, domestic M&A do
not lead to capital deepening in the target firm in post-acquisition periods.
34Note that we do not correct for sample attrition since we do not observe the exit of firms.
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Table A1: The cumulative effect of domestic M&A
TFP labor productivity
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test Y/L-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0327 (-1.51) 471/131753 .183 -.0309 (-1.29) 547/123418 .011
1 -.0115 (-0.42) 321/108106 .135 .0068 (0.25) 428/102346 .004
2 -.0312 (-0.77) 212/89236 .307 .0507 (1.52) 311/84419 .033
3 .0124 (0.32) 155/72489 .221 .0707∗ (1.64) 246/68329 .073
4 .0347 (0.81) 115/56958 .458 .0588 (1.33) 179/53696 .134
5 .0468∗ (1.93) 82/43246 .870 .0494 (.98) 134/40377 .627
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table A2 reveals that we do not find significant differences between the effects of vertical
and horizontal M&A.
Tables A3 shows the descriptive statistics for foreign-acquired firms that can not be ac-
counted for in the second stage of the difference-in-difference matching estimation. Table A4
lists the total number of deals in the population and our effective sample across two-digit NACE
industries. Finally, Table A5 reports the results for a TFP index relative to industry averages
and the weighted TFP estimations based on Olley and Pakes (1996), respectively.
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Table A2: The cumulative effect of foreign vertical vs horizontal M&A on TFP
horizontal M&A vertical M&A
year TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test TFP-diff deals/obs LR-test
0 -.0703 (-1.59) 80/99986 .146 -.0453 (-1.48) 238/111931 .381
1 .0216 (0.49) 52/82136 .143 .0089 (0.28) 187/91880 .586
2 .0338 (0.54) 33/67717 .140 .0394 (0.86) 143/75697 .686
3 .0950 (.79) 21/54755 .173 .0169 (0.44) 112/61297 .451
4 .0750 (1.49) 18/43090 .326 .0028 (0.06) 74/48301 .433
5 .1601∗∗ (2.41) 15/32631 .136 -.1180∗ (-1.81) 57/36654 .334
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Table A3: Descriptive statistics including all foreign M&A
Target firms All other firms Missing foreign M&A
firms mean sd firms mean sd firms mean sd
lntfp-op 318 0.7 0.52 14330 0.71 0.6 288 0.68 0.62
Y/L 400 256.81 931.71 12884 552.88 2375.1 560 516.84 1380.57
lntfp-Caves 316 -1.12 2.54 14330 -0.19 31.01 282 -0.05 4.19
lntfp-ols 318 0.76 0.53 14330 0.8 0.6 288 0.79 0.63
return-cap 318 31.4 93.33 14330 28.69 70.89 275 2.46 135.83
debt-asset 318 0.02 0.02 14330 0.02 0.02 340 0.03 0.15
size 318 1.22 5.66 14330 5.79 4.86 642 2.86 1.33
age 318 27.68 24.72 14330 28.74 21.78 1953 18.80 18.77
state 318 0.14 0.35 14330 0.09 0.29 1953 0.11 0.31
quoted 318 0.06 0.24 14330 0.03 0.17 1953 0.05 0.22
exit 318 0.02 0.14 14330 0.03 0.17 1953 0.14 0.35
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Table A4: Number of foreign M&A by industry
M&A M&A % M&A % M&A
industry NACE total sample total sample % diff
mining and quarrying 10 51 5 2.25 1.57 -0.67
food, beverages, tobacco 15-16 65 16 2.86 5.03 2.17
textile products 17 13 3 0.57 0.94 0.37
wearing apparel, leather 18-19 11 2 0.48 0.63 0.14
wood products 20 6 0 0.26 0.00 -0.26
paper products 21 14 1 0.62 0.31 -0.30
publishing, printing 22 58 10 2.55 3.14 0.59
chemical products 23-24 81 18 3.57 5.66 2.09
rubber, plastic products 25 38 11 1.67 3.46 1.79
non-metallic mineral products 26 28 4 1.23 1.26 0.02
basic metals 27 12 2 0.53 0.63 0.10
fabricated metal products 28 72 16 3.17 5.03 1.86
machinery and equipment 29 60 12 2.64 3.77 1.13
office, electrical machinery 30-31 50 9 2.20 2.83 0.63
communication equipment 32 28 3 1.23 0.94 -0.29
optical instruments 33 42 4 1.85 1.26 -0.59
motor vehicles, trailers 34 15 2 0.66 0.63 -0.03
other transport equipment 35 15 2 0.66 0.63 -0.03
furniture and recycling 36-37 72 12 3.17 3.77 0.60
electricity, gas, water supply 40-41 27 0 1.19 0.00 -1.19
construction 45 68 20 2.99 6.29 3.30
sale, repair of motor vehicles 50 15 5 0.66 1.57 0.91
wholesale, commission trade 51 185 35 8.15 11.01 2.86
retail trade 52 55 13 2.42 4.09 1.67
land transport 60 13 2 0.57 0.63 0.06
water and air transport 61-62 24 8 1.06 2.52 1.46
auxiliary transport activities 63 38 5 1.67 1.57 -0.10
post and telecommunications 64 45 6 1.98 1.89 -0.09
financial intermediation 65 80 6 3.52 1.89 -1.64
auxiliary financial intermediation 67 34 3 1.50 0.94 -0.55
real estate activities 70 46 6 2.03 1.89 -0.14
renting machinery, equipment 71 13 4 0.57 1.26 0.69
computer and related activities 72 306 22 13.47 6.92 -6.56
R&D and other business 73-74 591 51 26.02 16.04 -9.99
Sum 2271 318 100 100 0
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Table A5: The cumulative effect of foreign M&A on TFP as an index or weighted
foreign M&A Hausman
year TFP-OP-index deals/obs LR-test TFP-OP-weighted deals/obs LR-test test (H)
0 -.1008 (-1.13) 318/124688 .204 -.3032 (-1.34) 318/124843 .201 1.12
1 -.0592 (-1.48) 239/102582 .226 .1079 (.48) 239/101876 .158 0.18
2 .3725 (0.89) 176/84647 .181 .4120 (1.40) 175/84071 .153 1.63
3 .0093 (0.11) 133/68581 .212 .2595 (.87) 131/68109 .162 0.59
4 -.0727 (-1.21) 92/54050 .214 .2393 (.84) 90/53676 .194 0.60
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. The Hausman test indicates that the results
from the weighted estimation and the unweighted in Table 4 are not significant at conventional levels.
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